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Allan C Hutchinson* 
 
 
As their title suggests, ‘legal philosophers’ are more philosophers than 
lawyers; they are in the business of thinking generally about law 
rather than doing law in any practical way. While lawyers tend to be 
jurisdiction-specific in their affiliations and competence, legal 
philosophers are under no such restriction. They are not only free 
to roam broadly and deeply, but many feel a professional obligation 
to do so. At their most ambitious, legal philosophers claim dominion 
over a jurisprudential realm that is delineated by neither 
geography nor history. Indeed, presenting themselves as 
intellectual citizens of the whole legal world, their crafted 
contributions are intended to be judged not by the contingent 
standards of local usefulness, but by the pure canons of universal 
validity. As such, the professional commitment and authority of 
legal philosophers is based upon their capacity to deal with 
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parochial matters of law, but in a way that rises above and is not 
reducible to their local circumstances. Accordingly, while these legal 
philosophers might talk about morality and politics as they 
relate to law, they do so only in the most theoretical and 
abstract terms. For them, philosophy inhabits the realm of ‘truth 
and necessity’ in which the contingent and the local holds little or 
no analytical sway. 
The contemporary champion of legal philosophy is undoubtedly 
Joseph Raz. His extensive and sophisticated work represents the 
high-water mark of analytical jurisprudence. With the recent 
publication of Between Authority and Interpretation, he has provided an 
accessible and stylish showcase of his philosophical theory of law 
that is as rigorous and demanding as it is provocative and 
controversial. Because this book builds on as it clarifies and 
develops the main themes of his work over the past four decades, it 
offers itself as a convenient focus for a more general assessment of 
Raz’s whole oeuvre.1 In traversing law’s terrain, he is adamant that, 
whatever the purposes and methods of other disciplines (sociology, 
history, anthropology, etc), any philosophical analysis worth its name 
must concern itself with delivering insights and understanding about 
law that are of universal significance. While general conclusions 
about local laws and systems are important and helpful, they will have 
no philosophical value unless they can say something general and 
enduring about law as an institutional phenomenon. A corollary of this 
is that legal philosophy must insulate itself from contingent moral 
and political influences that will compromise or contaminate its 
 
project of making statements about law’s nature and operation that 
are not only universally valid, but also locally accurate. As Raz 
himself puts it, ‘where necessity reigns, considerations of moral and 
political desirability have no role to play’.2 
In this essay, I intend to challenge Raz’s philosophical 
ambitions—and, therefore, much contemporary work in legal 
philosophy—by concentrating on his crucial methodological 
distinction between the local and contingent and the universal 
and necessary. It will be my contention that, as there are no places 
where ‘moral and political desirability’ do not play a role, 
‘necessity’ has no reign. Accordingly, I will argue that legal 
philosophy cannot live up to its own methodological 
expectations and standards of validation. For all its impressive 
erudition and sophistication, therefore, Raz’s work is a 
manifesto of ‘local enthusiasms’ that, while instructive and useful 
in themselves, can lay no claim to reveal the necessary features of 
law’s existence. His work comprises some very contingent and 
localised generalisations that no amount of philosophical razzle-
dazzle can elevate to universal and global truths about law. 
Blinded by the philosophical light, there is more formal brilliance 
than substantive bottom-line to Raz’s  jurisprudence. 
There are many different arguments that might be made against 
Raz’s account of law, but I will concentrate on three in particular.3 
After introducing the main themes in Raz’s jurisprudence, I will 
devote my critical attention to the dubious philosophical status 
of his philosophical project, the elusive nature of his 
 
law/morality distinction, and the flawed depiction of legal 
interpretation’s role. Throughout, I will suggest that, while there 
are many local enthusiasms that Raz exhibits and to which I can 
subscribe, none of these merit the universal authority that he 
claims for them. Finally, while there is much that is insightful and 
profound about Raz’s ideas, he also has a tendency for opacity and 
oracularity. As such, I hope to offer a robust challenge to Raz’s 
Between Authority and Interpretation without disrespecting it. 
 
 
I. NO ORDINARY JOE 
 
It can be safely reported that Joseph Raz is now considered the 
leading positivist and, arguably, the leading jurist of his time. Once 
a student of HLA Hart, he is now giving his former mentor a run for 
his money in the jurisprudential sweepstakes. Furthermore, he is 
more than a match for Ronald Dworkin, also a student of Hart’s, in 
persuading jurists of the pertinence of his own positivist account of 
law. In Between Authority and Interpretation, he offers further 
reflections on legal philosophy and provides some telling 
clarifications and defences of his own theory of law. While the book’s 
13 chapters have almost all been previously published, their 
compilation allows and invites a sustained re-appraisal of the basic 
ideas and arguments which he has been developing over the course of 
his long career. In this regard, it is a veritable tour de force. Although a 
demanding read that expects much of its readers,4 the book is a 
 
wonderful exemplar of Raz’s style and oeuvre for better and for 
worse. 
What defines and distinguishes positivists is their approach to the 
relationship between law and morality. For the most part, they fully 
accept and recognise that law and morality are inextricably 
connected as a historical matter of social fact and that morality 
features in a variety of ways in determining law’s nature. However, 
they maintain that an analytical approach to law requires, as a 
matter of philosophical clarity, that the issue of law’s validity be 
understood in terms of social sources, not moral merits: ‘legal 
positivism is normatively inert’.5 Accordingly, while all law has an 
inevitable moral content and should be evaluated in terms of its 
moral worth, positivists maintain that its existence and identity as 
law not only can, but must be determined without taking any kind of 
stand on its moral substance. 
Raz’s reputation and high standing rest on the distinctive 
and powerful contribution that he has made to jurisprudential 
efforts to develop, fine-tune and defend this basic positivist stance. 
His ideas are starkly positivist in ambition and realisation; there has 
been an enviable constancy of both purpose and performance in his 
writings. While his account of law as a body of authoritative rules 
holds much intuitive appeal, the genius (as well as the devil) is in the 
details of his exposition of the relationship between law and morality. 
Accordingly, it is important to explore his sophisticated elaborations 
of conceptual analysis, legal interpretation and legal authority in 
order to grasp the appeal and force of Raz’s theory of law and its 
 
special brand of legal positivism. In so doing, it is instructive to 
distinguish Raz’s idea of law from both those of other positivist 
theorists and those of positivism’s antagonists.6 It then 
becomes possible to get a more nuanced feel for his 
philosophically dense thesis about the nature of law. Indeed, for Raz, 
those positivists and non-positivists share much more with each other 
than with his own legal theory. A non-positivist account of law insists 
that a full conceptual account of legal validity demands close 
interpretive attention to its moral content and normative purposes. 
At their most generous, non-positivists contend that it is not so much 
that positivism is entirely wrong-headed in its analysis and 
recommendations, rather it is seriously incomplete due to its failure to 
recognise and accept its broader evaluative dimensions; it ignores the 
vital appreciation that law’s social facts have inescapable moral 
components. For instance, Dworkin’s law-as-integrity model of law 
holds to the line that ‘propositions of law are true if they figure 
in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and 
procedural due process that provide the best constructive 
interpretation of the community’s legal practice’.7 As even positivists 
concede, law (whether in the form of constitutional 
provisions, legislative enactments or common law rules) is shot 
through with moral terms and evaluative standards—reasonable 
care, fair dealing, honesty, good faith conduct, etc. 
Consequently, modern positivists are obliged to make a much 
better fist of explaining and defending their defining ‘separation 
thesis’. In particular, the most pressing challenge is to 
 
demonstrate convincingly how these obvious moral occurrences 
in legal rules can be squared with the positivists’ rigorous insistence on 
the split between law and morality. 
There were two distinctive responses from positivists.8 One came 
from Hart and his followers. They took the softer line that, although 
law and morality must be kept analytically distinct, moral values 
can still be incorporated and feature in determining matters 
of legal validity; their inclusion does not require any 
independent judgement about their moral truth and does not ask 
jurists to take a stand on their controversial quality. As such, law’s 
identity can still be determined by its source-based pedigree, not its 
intrinsic moral merit. While this more ‘inclusive’ mode of positivism 
goes a long way to accommodating the non-positivist critique, it does 
so at the considerable cost of reducing the supposed differences 
between positivists and non-positivists almost to vanishing point. 
Indeed, there is much merit to Dworkin’s triumphalist claim that this 
version of positivism is ‘stunningly like my own’ and that it is ‘hard to 
see any genuine difference’.9 Soft theorists maintained their 
positivist faith, but at the cost of their jurisprudential souls. 
Raz was and is having none of this. He insists that legal norms 
must be capable of being identified strictly by their pedigree alone 
and without reference to moral criteria. In regard to his soft 
positivist cousins, he is adamant that to allow the incorporation 
of moral standards in any way as part and parcel of legal rules would 
severely and perhaps fatally compromise the separation thesis. 
For him, it is axiomatic that the identification of law and its 
 
content be achieved ‘without resort to moral considerations’10 if 
positivism is to be secure against the non-positivists’ criticisms. As 
such, Raz holds steadfast to the claim that law’s identity must be 
determined exclusively by reference to factual sources only. The 
law’s apparent incorporation of moral standards is nothing more 
than ‘an indication that certain considerations are not excluded’.11 
It most certainly is not a recognition that those moral standards are 
part of law qua moral standards. 
More precisely, Raz explains that it is not that law excludes 
morality, rather it ‘modifies … the way moral considerations 
apply’.12 For instance, in the same way that conflicts-of-law rules 
give temporary legal effect to foreign laws in specified situations 
without making them part of the law itself, some constitutional rules 
give legal effect to certain moral norms without making them part 
of the law itself. In both cases, contrary to the claims of the inclusive, 
soft or incorporationist positivist, foreign law and morality are not 
incorporated into the law and thereby become part of the law. Moral 
standards are treated much the same as rules of financial 
accounting or actuarial tables; they are relied on and resorted to 
by judges and lawyers, but they do not become part of law and, 
therefore, count as law by that fact. As such, law ‘concretiz[es] moral 
principles’13 and, having done so, turns them into social facts, not 
moral values. In this way, issues of legal validity and moral legitimacy 
are kept conceptually separate. 
Accordingly, if soft positivists maintain that there are no necessary 
connections between law and morality, it might be thought that hard 
 
positivists would insist that there are necessarily no connections 
between law and morality. But this is not entirely accurate. Hard 
positivists argue that, while there are many connections between 
law and morality, law’s identity does not depend at all on its meeting 
any test of moral legitimacy; law is entirely source-based in its claims to 
validity and moral considerations have nothing to offer and no role to 
play in such inquiries. As such, legal rules are held to be strictly 
social phenomena that can be identified in an entirely objective 
and factual way by reference to an uncontested source of authority; 
there is an analytically unbridgeable chasm between formal 
pedigree and moral substance. In direct opposition to the soft 
positivists, Raz resists the moralist-inspired criticisms and stands firm 
in his defence of an uncompromising positivist account of law and 
legal systems. 
From a Razian perspective, therefore, law exists and functions as 
both a fact and a norm. It is a social fact in that ‘its existence and 
content can be established … without reliance on moral 
arguments’.14 This means that there can be good and bad laws as 
well as morally legitimate or illegitimate legal systems: inquiries 
into what the law is are separate from what the law ought to be. 
While law can by its nature be used to realise valuable ends and 
can be considered to have a variety of moral tasks to perform, law is 
not by its nature a morally valuable institution, even if it is morally 
significant.15 History has shown time and again that law has been 
used, in big and small ways, for immoral purposes. However, law is 
also normative in that ‘it aims to guide people’s conduct and it 
 
claims authority to do so’.16 Although it may fail to make good on 
its claim, its authority flows from its theoretical capacity to do so. 
It is this idea of ‘authority’ that lies at the heart of Raz’s 
jurisprudence. For him, a legal system comprises those rules that 
seek to offer a rational and authoritative guide to human conduct. It 
is not so much whether that system and its rules have actual 
authority, but whether they can make a plausible and practical 
claim to legitimate authority in a particular society. As such, law is 
an institutionally backed set of reasons for people to do or not do 
things. Legal rules operate as place-markers for substantive reasons. 
It is Raz’s contention that people comply with rules rather than 
determine for themselves what would be the right thing to do in 
particular circumstances: ‘the law is a special kind of reason for it 
displaces the reasons which it is meant to reflect’.17 These rules must 
be identifiable as social facts and, therefore, be capable of 
identification without resort to non-legal or evaluative moral criteria. 
If the rules cannot be identified and followed in this way, they are no 
longer serving their primary normative function and, therefore, 
cannot make the practical difference that they are intended to 
make and upon which their authority is based. As such, law is an 
authoritative system of norms that must be identifiable and 
serviceable on its own terms. If it is not, then its authority is illusory 
and such norms no longer qualify as legal rules, whatever their 
appeal and authority as moral, religious or other value-based 
directives.18 
There is so much that is rewarding and insightful about Raz’s 
 
work. There is a reassuring sharpness to the distinctions made, an 
unflinching commitment to analytical rigour, and a welcome 
confidence in demarcating law’s nature and operation. However, 
there is also much that is off-putting and obfuscating. Raz tends to be 
philosophically extravagant in the claims he makes for his 
analytical conclusions. None of this is helped by the clotted nature 
of some of his prose. 
 
 
II. FROM UNIVERSAL TO PAROCHIAL AND BACK 
 
In recent years, legal theory has taken a decidedly ‘methodological’ 
turn. While the main focus of jurisprudential engagement largely 
remains the ‘separation thesis’, considerable attention has been 
given to the prior epistemological question of whether it is 
possible to intervene in the law/morality issue in a way that is itself 
untouched or uncontaminated by moral values or other evaluative 
criteria. It is no longer sufficient for jurists to support their 
theoretical claims about ‘what law is’; they must also defend the 
deeper status of those theoretical claims. It has become a matter of 
showing not only what propositions are true about law’s nature, but 
also what it means for those propositions to be true.19 The 
especial challenge for positivists is that, in defending the 
separation of law and morality, they must ensure that their 
jurisprudential explanation is itself not breached by ideological or 
partial values. 
 
Raz has always made it plain that he is in the business of 
disclosing ‘universal truths’. A great strength of his brand of legal 
positivism is claimed to be that it makes and defends its central 
insights as truth-claims that apply wherever and whenever law is 
found. For him, therefore, the main task of legal philosophy is to 
establish ‘the kind of institution that law is’20 by ascertaining ‘a set of 
systematically-related true propositions about the nature of law’21 
that can assert universal validity by virtue of their philosophically-
necessary status. While a theory must be capable of applying to ‘all the 
legal systems which ever existed or that could exist’,22 he gladly 
concedes that there will be local variations and deviations in terms of 
law’s boundaries at particular times; it is the core or standard case 
that Raz maintains should engage the legal philosopher’s 
attention and concerns. Accordingly, when it comes to the 
epistemological status of Raz’s inquiry, it is resoundingly clear that 
he offers his conclusions as being universally true and that, 
‘where necessity reigns, considerations of moral and political 
desirability have no role to play’.23 It is unapologetically 
presented as legal theory on a grand scale and in a grand style. 
In the past decade, as part of the methodological turn in legal 
theory, critics of the analytical project have noted that the universal 
claims that legal theorists like Raz make for their theoretical 
observations are extravagant and indefensible. The basic thrust of 
the critique is that, despite the universal ambitions of positivists 
in elucidating the nature of law, their efforts are very much 
entrenched in the parochial conditions of late twentieth-century 
 
western industrialised societies. While these philosophical accounts 
of law have much to tell us about the nature of law in those societies, 
they do little to illuminate the nature of law in other societies. There 
are so many other legal arrangements—tribal, transnational, 
indigenous, customary, etc—that do not comply with this centralised, 
top-down, state-centred model of law and governance. As such, Raz 
commits the familiar philosophical error of mistaking one contested 
and contingent understanding of law as its unifying and universal 
essence. As Raz himself correctly sums up this objection, ‘it is a 
parochial study of an aspect of our culture rather than universal 
study of the nature of law’.24 
In Between Authority and Interpretation, Raz acknowledges this line 
of critique and attempts to deflect its debilitating effects.25 He is 
insistent that these critical allegations are ‘misguided’26 and do 
not unduly hamper or hobble the theoretical status of his 
jurisprudential project. However, he does introduce several important 
alterations and significant qualifications to his account of law. 
Although they are offered in the form of clarifications and suggest 
that there has been no substantial switch of position, it seems 
obvious that this is not the case. More importantly, these changes in 
his position are not only far from convincing, but they actually do 
serious damage to the cogency and strength of his theoretical claims. 
Rather than refute the ‘parochial’ concerns, Raz manages to 
confirm their critical bite. There is much intellectual razzamatazz, 
but it does little to advance our substantive understanding of legal 
theory that his critics or even Raz would demand. 
 
In order to understand Raz’s response, it is necessary to 
provide a more thorough account of his own particular 
jurisprudential methodology. Building on Hart’s notion of an 
‘internal attitude’,27 Raz insists that any account of law’s nature 
must draw upon and accommodate the self-understanding of 
participants in the legal system: ‘it is part of the self-
consciousness of our society to see certain institutions as 
legal’.28 This means that legal philosophy is not a detached exercise 
in academic taxonomy; it is devoted to ‘inquiring into the 
typology of social institutions, not into the semantic of terms’.29 By 
entering into such an inquiry, the purpose is to apprehend the 
‘concept of law’ by, among other things, ‘explaining the conditions 
for minimal possession of the concept, that is those, essential or 
nonessential, properties of what the concept is a concept of, 
knowledge of which is necessary for the person to have the 
concept at all, however incomplete his or her mastery of it may be’.30 
Consequently, the Raz-influenced jurist will be concerned to isolate 
and refine the concept of law which people hold and which will 
influence their society’s governance and exercise of authority. 
Importantly, there is no need for people to have a full appreciation 
of the concept of law in order for it to be of practical significance in 
their social practices and lives. 
The difficulty, as Raz concedes, is that, if such concepts of law are 
embedded in societies and are for that reason culturally specific, 
how is it possible to maintain the claim that the resulting 
conclusions about the nature of law are not themselves culturally 
 
specific? It is at this point that the philosophical waters start to 
become very muddy. Raz states that ‘while the concept of law is 
parochial, ie not all societies have it, our inquiry is universal in that 
it explores the nature of law, wherever it is to be found’.31 In 
explicating further why concepts of law might be parochial, but why 
legal theory is not and might still be considered to be universal, Raz 
goes on to say: 
 
This means that in legal theory there is a tension between the parochial and 
the universal. It is both parochial and universal. On the one hand it is 
parochial, for it aims to explain an institution designated by a 
concept that is a local concept, a product of modern western 
civilisation. On the other hand it is universal theory for it applies to law 
whenever and wherever it can conceivably be, and its existence does not 
presuppose the existence of its concept, indeed it does not presuppose 
the existence of any legal concept.32 
 
Insofar as I understand this claim, Raz seems to be suggesting 
that all legal theorising begins with the concept of law in our own 
societies. Having fixed its terms (eg, an authoritative system of 
rules that can be fixed without resort to moral considerations), 
we then survey all societies across time and geography and 
determine whether their social practices can be said to instantiate 
such a concept. If they do, they have law and, if they do not, they do 
not have law, at least according to our own concept of law. It is not 
decisive that those people in other cultures do not share our 
concept of law. If their social practices gel with the essential conditions 
 
of our concept of law, they will have a legal system: ‘legal theory is 
merely the study of the necessary features of law, given “our” 
concept of law’.33 
While this explanation has a veneer of plausibility, it surely does 
not bear close scrutiny. Contrary to the original universalistic claims of 
much analytical philosophy generally and legal philosophy 
particularly, Raz’s clarifications manage to pull the universal rug 
from under his own feet and reveal him to be standing squarely on very 
parochial ground. And if his feet are firmly planted on the local soil 
of contingent cultural practices, it is impossible to grasp how his 
philosophical peregrinations can escape those confines and continue 
to lay claim to universal validity. The most that his modified 
parochial-universal approach can do is to clarify which other societies 
in the world have legal systems like our own and which do not. 
This does not so much deflect the criticism that he is merely 
theorising about the nature of law in the parochial conditions of late 
twentieth-century Western industrialised societies as confirm it. As 
importantly, he privileges that particular account of law’s essential 
nature by foisting it upon the world across both territory and history. 
A presumable corollary of Raz’s efforts to negotiate the tension 
between the parochial and the universal is that each society 
might well develop its own legal theory à la Raz in line with its own 
concept of law. This would mean that there would be as many legal 
theories as there were concepts of law. Moreover, on Raz’s account, 
each would be able to argue that they were involved in a truly 
philosophical enterprise in that conclusions about the nature of 
 
law would also be able to claim universal legitimacy. In such 
circumstances, the best we can note is that there would many 
different concepts of law, as many different theories of law, and 
many incommensurable yet universal conclusions about the nature 
of law. Such a world would not only be baffling to the uncommitted 
observer, it would defy any notion that legal philosophers had 
anything special, let alone ‘necessarily true’, to say about law’s nature. 
Raz’s response to this is blunt, but not to the point and entirely 
unconvincing: ‘the objectivity and universality of the theory of law 
is not affected by the fact that the concept of law (which is our 
concept of law) is parochial and not shared by all the people nor by 
all the cultures, which live or lived under the law’.34 This response is 
hardly reassuring for the jurisprudential adept, but it will be warmly 
received by those pragmatic theorists who challenge the 
universalistic claims of analytical theorists. The Razian study of 
law and legal systems may be universal, but its parameters and 
the conclusions reached are surely not. Whatever Raz claims to be 
doing, he is no longer, if he ever was, in the game of explaining law’s 
nature as ‘a set of systematically-related true propositions about the 
nature of law’.35 Or, if he is, the whole nature of what counts as 
truth and necessity has been radically transformed to such an 
extent that the philosophical space between the parochial and 
universal has been almost totally elided. 
Raz places much faith in the existence of ‘our’ concept of law. 
But there are so many difficulties with fleshing out what is referenced 
by this ‘our’. While there might well be a reasonably settled and 
 
homogenous sense of ‘our’ in some societies, it is far from clear that 
this is so in many other societies. Indeed, it is in those late 
twentieth-century Western industrialised societies that the 
appreciation of ‘our’ is becoming highly contested and relatively thin 
in scope and substance. While there will obviously be a degree of 
uncertainty and indeterminacy about any concept’s precise ambit, 
there may well be competing and occasionally contradictory concepts 
in play at the same time in some societies. Moreover, it is not obvious 
at what level of generality the concept of law as a snapshot of people’s 
self-understandings needs to be made. Although there may be 
certain similarities between the societies of the United Kingdom, 
the United States of America or Canada and their concepts of law, 
there are also crucial dissimilarities. At what point do those 
dissimilarities become so significant that they take precedence over 
the similarities? Without some independent conceptual metric by 
which to gauge this set-off, there is a risk that every society will 
have its own concept of law. Even if there was considerable 
congruence among different societies’ concept of law, any conclusions 
drawn would remain parochial and contingent. All of this would 
surely defy any sensible way to talk about a theory of law in Raz’s 
sense. 
In short, contrary to Raz’s intentions, philosophical necessity 
has itself been parochialised and thereby robbed of its vaunted 
qualities of theoretical authority. When Raz states that ‘where 
necessity reigns, considerations of moral and political desirability 
have no role to play’,36 he has simply made a rod for his own back. 
 
By his own account, all analyses of the concept of law originate in 
and are limited by the practical details of their parochial setting. 
This being the case, ‘political and moral’ considerations are 
inevitably in play in comprising and informing those local 
conditions; they will switch and change as society itself shifts 
and alters. Consequently, if necessity only reigns where such 
considerations have no role, then necessity has no purchase and, 
therefore, no importance. Rather than take flight into some abstract 
realm where the normal rules of earthly locomotion seemingly no 
longer apply, Raz has clipped legal philosophers’ wings. More 
precisely, he has revealed what critics thought all along, namely that 
legal theorists have feet of clay. So, when Raz claims that ‘a claim to 
necessity is in the nature of the enterprise [of legal theory]’,37 he has 
not only failed to save legal philosophy from a timely demise at the 
hands of his ‘parochial’ critics; he has also effectively contributed to 
writing analytical jurisprudence’s and his own philosophical obituary. 
 
 
III. LAW, BAD LAW AND NO LAW 
 
Although Raz’s efforts to negotiate the tension between the 
parochial and the universal undermine the philosophical status of 
his overall jurisprudential project, they also create equally 
devastating problems for the positivist aspirations of his theory of 
law. This is particularly evident in his account of what it means for a 
legal system or law to exist as something distinct from other 
 
normative schemes of moral or other evaluative modes of regulation. 
In charting the crucial separation of law and morality, Raz’s 
parochialism (or faux-universalism) becomes even more 
apparent. Indeed, if further proof was needed, the arguments he 
employs to explicate the law/morality connection confirm still 
further that his theory of law, insofar as it is based upon our 
concept of law, is a theory of law about mid-to-late twentieth-
century Western industrialised societies.38 His theory is not only limited 
in its capacity to provide informative and fruitful insights about 
other societies and their ‘law’, it is also unconvincing. As Between 
Authority and Interpretation amply shows, the crucial boundaries 
drawn by Raz between law, bad law and non-law become fraught 
with both conceptual and practical difficulty. 
As Raz is at pains to point out, the essential characteristics 
of law (ie, an authoritative set of rules which exists and is 
identifiable without regard to moral considerations) are those that 
make law what it is and are ‘found in law wherever and whenever it 
exists’.39 Being universal, the theory must be capable of applying to 
‘all the legal systems which ever existed or that could exist’.40 While 
law can change over time and across the world, he maintains that 
the nature of law does not; it remains universal in its application 
and relevance. However, as importantly, the essential 
characteristics of law are also those without which it would no longer be 
law. Consequently, if ‘the institutions and practices of a country which 
constitute its law 
… lose the properties which are essential to the law, … the result is 
 
not that the law changes its nature, but that the country no longer 
has a legal system’.41 For Raz, therefore, whatever else it may have, 
any society that relies on a system of governance that does not exhibit 
the features of a state-backed series of authoritative rules has no 
legal system.42 None of this, of course, means that such a society will 
not have a legal system that accords with its own concept of law; it will 
simply not have a system of governance that merits being described 
as ‘law’ in terms of our own concept of law. Furthermore, in keeping 
with his positivist commitments, whether a legal system exists will be a 
matter of factual enquiry; assessments as to whether it is a good or bad 
legal system will depend on the moral content of its rules. 
 
However, while there is a certain conceptual symmetry and 
neatness to all this, it renders his whole notion of legal theory even 
more recherché and precious than many already consider it to be. 
If legal theorists are not trying to do more than describe the 
essential features of one or a few legal systems that presently exist in 
our own societies, then it is unclear in what sense they are engaged 
in a philosophical endeavour by their own intellectual lights. It 
becomes an exercise in mere linguistic labelling more than 
conceptual analysis. Moreover, even by the terms of our own 
concept of law, it is unclear why a legal system that lacks certain 
features that Raz considers essential to law’s existence should be 
treated as not being law as opposed to being a poor or bad system of 
law; it will be law, but not a complete or adequate one. Rather than 
there be law or no-law, it is surely better to say that some legal 
systems are of lesser value as legal systems, regardless of the 
 
substantive content of their rules. There are, of course, important 
implications in such an assessment for Raz’s ‘hard’ positivist stance 
about the necessary separation of law and morality. 
Imagine a present-day society very similar to that of late 
twentieth-century Western industrialised societies, like the 
United Kingdom, the United States of America or Canada. 
Following an unanticipated and sudden series of economic crises 
as well as natural disasters, a coup d’état overthrows the 
government and a theocracy is installed. Rule is brutally 
maintained and based upon strict Old Testament-based religious 
dogma. Opposition is forbidden and non-conformists are executed by 
the state. All power is entrusted to local clerics who rely entirely on 
the Bible for guidance and whose decisions are final in all 
disputes. Furthermore, decisions about culpability and 
punishment in individual cases are made entirely in camera and with 
no judgment or explanation given. ‘Clarifications’ of biblical 
interpretation are circulated secretly to local clerics by the supreme 
religious leader. Let us call this society ‘Gileban’.43 
An attempted application of Raz’s legal theory to this social 
development is illuminating. While it is difficult to state 
categorically exactly how Raz would respond, his most up-to-
date ideas in Between Authority and Interpretation point in certain 
clear directions. Indeed, there are several conclusions that the critic 
might draw—law’s validity can depend on moral criteria; bad law is 
not always equivalent to no law; and the extent of law is as much a 
moral as a factual inquiry. Each seems to be less than helpful 
 
individually and especially collectively to his overall project to set 
out and defend an uncompromising positivist account of law’s 
nature. 
First, Gilebanian society seems to contradict Raz’s insistence 
that law exists as something separate from other modes of 
value-based governance. By recommending a sharp separation 
between law’s validity and its moral legitimacy, his account of law 
strongly suggests that no legal system can or could exist which makes 
law’s validity depend entirely and exclusively on its moral legitimacy. 
The existence of such a legal system would confound the underlying 
universal structure and claims to authority of Raz’s schema by fusing 
rather than keeping separate law’s validity and moral legitimacy. 
After all, it is an important feature of law’s nature that people follow 
its rules as law and not as moral imperatives. However, that is what 
many theological systems of law, like Gileban, do. The force and 
validity of the system’s orders are both directly and indirectly 
based upon the society’s religious commitments; there is 
simply no law that can be immoral or whose content can be 
something other than its biblical source. What makes a rule into a 
legal rule is its status as religious ordinance, and what gives it its 
legitimacy is its claims to religious authority.44 In a society like 
Gileban, it is not so much that law overlaps with morality and religion 
as that they become fused into one and the same thing. 
Consequently, contrary to Raz’s hard positivist claims, legal 
validity can sometimes and, on occasion, must be determined by 
reference to its content or in terms of its larger moral legitimacy. 
 
Secondly, Gileban raises some pressing problems for Raz’s 
conclusion that, despite appearances to the contrary, sometimes law 
does not exist. One response by Raz to the first critical observation is 
that a system like Gileban, whatever else it is, is simply not a legal 
system; law does not exist in such a society. Indeed, it seems 
apparent that the theocratic regime of Gileban would not count as a 
legal system in Raz’s reckoning because it is not in accord with his 
rendition of what ‘our’ concept of law would demand. Among 
other things, Raz is of the opinion that ‘it is the essence of law 
that it expects people to be aware of its existence and, when 
appropriate, to be guided by it’.45 Accordingly, for Raz, there will be no 
legal system unless there exist directives or norms that are 
capable of identification without direct resort to (religious) moral 
considerations and that these are presented and operate as 
someone else’s, not your own, view about how you ought to behave. 
Raz’s basic conditions for a legal system’s existence only barely 
apply to the Gileban regime, if at all. People will be aware that the 
Old Testament is the only authoritative source of all instruction in 
all things; its religious say-so trumps all other possible sources of 
direction. However, there will be no public or formal guidance 
available as to how to interpret its particular or competing 
demands in contentious circumstances. Gilebanians will simply 
have to hope (and pray?) that their actions comply with the Bible’s 
directives as interpreted by themselves. They will have no reliable ex-
ante (or even ex-post) means of informing themselves about how to 
behave properly and legally in any circumstances, let alone where 
 
there is uncertainty or doubt. Official caprice or revelation, not 
authoritative rules, will be very much the civic order of the day. 
Moreover, law’s essential Razian role as a mediating structure of 
authoritative guidance in people’s practical reasoning will be fatally 
compromised. 
However, if Raz is too quick and too wide-ranging in declaring 
that states like Gileban have only a pseudo-system of law, he will 
have undercut even further not only the universalistic claims of his 
legal theory, but also its practical plausibility. Raz states that a 
concept of law ‘is not a concept introduced by academics to help with 
explaining some social phenomena; rather it is‘a concept 
entrenched in our society’s self-understanding’ of what it is ‘to 
see certain institutions as legal’.46 Mindful also that he observes 
that ‘we know that the regulations of a golf club are not a legal 
system, and that independent states have legal systems’,47 it is 
puzzling why Gileban would not be considered to have a legal 
system even when viewed through the lens of our own concept of 
law: it is an independent state and claims authority over its 
members. It would surely be more sensible and convincing to 
report that our society’s self-understanding would more likely than 
not see Gileban society as possessing a legal system, but a 
tyrannical or rudimentary one. To conclude otherwise would run 
the real risk that Raz had fallen into the very trap he highlights of 
treating the concept of law as ‘a concept introduced by academics to 
help with explaining some social phenomena’.48 As such, Raz’s likely 
consignment of Gileban to the realm of non-law would seem hasty 
 
and self-defeating at best. Put more generally, it is more reasonably 
the case that legal systems tend to fade into non-law than become 
such in one fell swoop. 
Thirdly (and this follows closely from the second observation), 
Raz’s probable treatment of Gileban as non-law raises some further 
and telling concerns about the extent to which his positivist theory of 
law-as-a-social-fact is insulated from moral considerations as he 
maintains. When I suggested that ‘our’ people would treat 
Gileban as a bad legal system (ie, as a tyrannical or minimal 
one), there was obviously an explicit evaluative appraisal involved; 
those legal systems that have open courts are more deserving and 
defensible than those that deploy a decidedly StarChamber 
approach to the resolution of disputes. However, if this were 
simply offered as an external judgement about the substantive 
content of particular legal rules, then it would obviously present no 
challenge to Raz’s positivist account. He would rightly point out 
that the value-based evaluation of legal rules is entirely in line with 
his insistence that a strict separation of law’s validity and its 
moral legitimacy is to be preserved. Unfortunately, in the case of 
Gileban’s ‘legal’ system, this Razian riposte is not so readily 
available. 
My challenge to Raz’s account is not so much about the content of 
any particular rule, it is more about the lack of any legal rules per se 
that people can know and be guided by in their daily social lives. The 
apparently arbitrary definition of particular wrongdoing and the 
unpredictable imposition of specific punishment, at least as 
 
experienced by the Gileban laity as opposed to its clerical elite, 
offends what many think of as the Rule of Law. While this failure to 
live up to such expectations is not automatically considered to 
deprive the system of its status as law, it is generally accepted that 
promulgated rules, due process, etc are vital components in any legal 
system that warrants support and approval. So, for instance, the 
continued existence of the detention centre at Guantanamo Bay 
might well be considered as an affront to many lawyers’ and citizens’ 
notions of what counts as a civilised and defensible process of 
governance, but few would go so far as to say that there is no legal 
system in operation there at all.49 In such matters, a more pragmatic 
dimmer-switch is to be preferred to the simplistic positivistic on-off 
device. 
This notion of the ‘Rule of Law’ is familiar to legal theorists and 
lawyers—should it be ‘our’ legal theorists and lawyers?—as an 
important feature of valued legal systems, but not the sine qua non 
of their validity. Ironically though, Raz appears to have built exactly 
this kind of evaluative element into his supposedly positivist 
account of law; he has smuggled in a value-laden criterion, but 
passed it off as an exclusive legal virtue. In this regard, in allowing 
for the fact that there might be better or worse legal systems 
regardless of the substantive content of their authoritative 
norms, Raz seems to find himself in the distinctly uncomfortable 
company of the unabashed naturalist Lon Fuller, who famously 
insisted that, if law did not live up to its own ‘inner morality’, it 
would not simply be ‘a bad system of law, [but] … something that 
 
is not properly called a legal system at all’.50 This conclusion 
seems to be so similar to Raz’s as to be indistinguishable. Although 
Raz would still likely insist that the Rule of Law is more aptly thought 
about in terms of efficacy than morality, there is a significant 
difference between whether tools are suited to their chosen 
function and whether law is sufficiently knowable to guide people’s 
conduct.51 To use Raz’s example, it is one thing to criticise knives as 
being insufficiently sharp to accomplish their cutting tasks; it is 
another thing entirely to condemn law for punishing people when 
they have no idea why and for what they are being punished. While 
conformity with the Rule of Law will obviously not itself guarantee a 
‘good’ legal system, its complete flouting will itself be a moral failing 
and contribute to the goodness or badness of the legal system, 
regardless of the substantive cut of its normative content. 
Under the guise of factual inquiry, therefore, Raz has imposed 
a qualitative dimension to law’s existence and, in the process, 
undermined the positivist foundations of his jurisprudence. It is not 
so much that Gileban’s particular rules are good or bad. After all, 
while some citizens of Gileban might object to its 
fundamentalist orientation, many citizens may well find its strict 
adherence to biblical morality to be exemplary. The problem is 
that the failure to make those rules knowable to the public so that, 
when in doubt as to how to act, they might be practically and 
authoritatively guided by them (and not their own unmediated 
reasoning and interpretation) renders Gileban’s legal system a less 
appealing legal system qua legal system. Contrary to Raz’s 
 
protestations, legal systems can be better or worse along a sliding 
evaluative scale rather than simply being law or non-law. Moreover, 
the fact that Fuller, unlike Raz, tends to utilise conformity with this 
‘inner morality’ more as a grounding for the moral obligation to 
obey or apply the law does not in itself change the fact that Raz’s 
reliance on these value-based criterion undercuts his social-fact 
thesis for law’s existence. In Gileban, there is simply no fact-of-the-
matter when it comes to law: there is no normal situation in which the 
law does a reasonable job at guiding conduct and thereby 
functioning as a viable mediating authoritative structure for 
practical reasoning. People will have no choice other than to resort to 
their own reasons for action based on their own efforts to interpret 
biblical texts to determine the content of Gileban’s rules; there will 
be no possibility of relying only on law’s authoritative directives as 
they only exist after the fact. 
Accordingly, while Raz recognises that there are many connections 
between law and morality and some necessary ones at that, he 
wants to hang on tenaciously to his definitive claim that there are 
some disconnections which must be appreciated and preserved if a 
positivist theory is to retain its intellectual credibility and analytical 
force. Yet, his authority-based account of law seems to flout that claim 
in significant ways. Of course, too much law can be as problematic 
as too little law; legalism can be as enfeebling for social justice as 
anarchy or totalitarianism. Nevertheless, although Raz claims to 
be indifferent to the moral qualities of law, he has managed to put in 
place an evaluative threshold to law’s existence. By allowing 
 
evaluative considerations to infiltrate his positivist account of law, 
he has softened his selfimposed hard stance on the need to keep 
questions of legal validity separate from those of moral legitimacy. 
None of this challenges the basic and salutary positivist precept 
that law can be a vehicle for immorality as much as it can be a 
bulwark against it.52 However, what it does suggest is that, if Raz is 
considered to be the most die-hard of positivists in his adherence to a 
strict law/morality divide, then both Raz and other positivists are left 
very exposed and in need of much greater defence than is presently 
on offer in Between Authority and Interpretation. 
 
 
IV. OF OBJECTS AND OBJECTIONS 
 
Raz places great weight on the distinction between law-making, 
law and lawapplication. In the Razian scheme of things, it is only law 
that is autonomous from moral considerations, not its making or its 
interpretive application: ‘the distinction between identifying the law 
and changing it is basic to the law, and central to any coherent 
understanding of judicial decision-making’.53 For Raz, there is a sharp 
and crucial distinction between reasoning to fix the content of law 
at any point in time ‘without resort to evaluative considerations’54 
and reasoning to apply that law to particular circumstances and 
situations: one is reasoning to law’s premises, whereas the other is 
reasoning from law’s premises. This is a crucial distinction and goes 
some way towards vindicating his central positivist claim that law 
 
can be identified as a social fact. However, even if law-application is 
interpretive and, therefore, fraught with values, Raz reminds us 
that, once interpretation is complete in a particular case, the 
resulting interpretation is absorbed into the law, which can again 
can be identified and fixed as a fact-of-the-matter. Therefore, while 
moral considerations feature in the adjudicative application of legal 
rules, they do not become law until they are incorporated by way of a 
legal decision. 
Understood in this way, it is obvious that Raz must be able to 
demonstrate that law can be identified independently of 
interpretation. He does this by drawing a comparison between art 
interpretation and legal interpretation. To begin with, he 
acknowledges that ‘there is meaning in the world only where it was invested 
with meaning by human beings’.55 Nevertheless, its human quality 
means that it is value-laden, but does not render it an ‘anything 
goes’ free-for-all. There may well be no one fixed interpretive 
meaning available, but ‘there is no conflict or tension between 
pluralism and objectivity as such’.56 In interpreting art, music or 
literature, he maintains that ‘a good interpretation is one that 
explains the meaning of its object’.57 Most importantly, Raz insist 
that ‘interpretations explain and do not change their objects; 
… what they affect is the meaning, not the object which it has’.58 
Consequently, all interpretation is a value-infused engagement 
with the original which gravitates inevitably between fidelity and 
fecundity. Innovative interpretations are still explanations of 
meaning, but ‘they show the object in a new light’.59 
 
As regards legal interpretation, Raz maintains a similar line by 
proposing that ‘the decisions of legal authorities are the primary 
objects, and through interpreting them we gain understanding of 
the content of the law, which they create’.60 However, Raz is no 
formalist. He offers a powerful critique of those who maintain that 
legal interpretation is necessarily and legitimately an exercise in 
retrieval;61 there is an unavoidable back-and-forth between 
innovation and preservation which allows the law to negotiate the 
competing demands of continuity and creativity. For Raz, therefore, 
legal interpretation is about the inevitably human and value-infused 
activity of giving meaning to those original legal resources of 
‘constitutions, statues, precedents, the texts in which they were 
formulated, legal rules and doctrines, and the law itself’.62 
Moreover, when it comes to law, interpretation must be 
objectfocused because of ‘moral respect for the law, and for its 
sources’.63 
By maintaining a strict distinction between the legal object to 
be interpreted and the act of legal interpretation, Raz claims to 
be able to preserve the vital positivist quality of law as something 
that can be identified as a matter of fact rather than by resort to 
moral evaluation. This means that he carries a heavy onus to 
demonstrate that the identification of law and its resources can 
be effectively distinguished from their legal interpretation as 
practical matters. If he is unable to do that, his central claim about 
law’s existence as a social fact will be severely compromised. I 
contend that such a sharp distinction cannot be maintained. The 
 
problem is that the value-infused interpretation of law bleeds 
into the factual identification of law to such an extent that the 
distinction is rendered unworkable; there is no available method or 
means to identify law as a pre-interpretive matter. It is not so much 
that law does not exist (it does, as a body of resources), or that its 
likely development is entirely unpredictable (it is not, as a result 
of the general political leanings of the judiciary). Legal history and 
practice strongly suggest that it is interpretation all the way down; law 
is a thoroughly human activity that envelops and infiltrates the legal 
resources to be interpreted.64 
It is true that, in law, there is constant toing-and-froing between 
fact and value. However, in contrast to Raz, I contend that this back-
and-forth is so integral to law as to be constitutive of it; it is law. Law 
is not something that exists before or after interpretive work; it is 
constituted in that interpretive activity. Whatever the case is in art 
and literature, legal object and legal interpretation merge so that 
one is not separable from the other in any sensible or persuasive way. 
While this is most evident in matters of common law adjudication, it 
is also apparent in constitutional law, which is really only a 
stylised mode of common law decision-making generally.65 A 
marked feature of common law adjudication is not so much that a 
rule is fixed beforehand and then applied to the facts of the case; a 
rule is fixed in light of the outcome that it will bring about in the 
particular case. There is constant mediation between rule-fixing and 
rule-application in the judicial decision-making process such that 
it becomes illusory to talk about there being two distinct stages 
 
as a practical matter. Of course, the fact that the final judgment 
rendered in the case might not reveal this process, or that it might 
work to actively conceal this dynamic process, hardly counts against 
this explanation. 
All this is by way of stating that law is always in the process of 
becoming rather than in a state of being—the law never simply is. In 
Raz’s preferred artistic terms, it is not simply the interpretation of 
the painting that changes or that the painting is shown by 
interpretation in a new light. The painting itself changes. For example, 
the painting of American constitutional law in 2009 is not the same 
as it was in 1809 or 1909. It is not only that its interpretations have 
changed; the constitution is much more than the constitutional 
document. It comprises doctrines, decisions and principles that 
develop and change over time.66 Moreover, there is never a finished 
painting; it is always a work-in-progress. In the process of 
establishing what it is, judicial artists and legal commentators 
are always repainting it. The very act of interpreting law changes it 
and, on important occasion, redraws it substantially; there is a 
whole new painting to be interpreted. It is only sensible to talk 
about interpretations being ‘conserving’ or ‘innovatory’ in terms of 
their political salience and moral effects. 
But to say more would be to take Raz’s artistic analogies too 
seriously and perpetuate a misleading depiction of law. He draws a 
false distinction between those who believe that there is objectivity 
and that interpretation is about retrieval and those who believe 
that there is only subjectivity and that interpretation is about 
 
creation; it is neither one nor the other. In the legal world, the judge is 
as much the artist as the critic or interpreter. Law/art is not 
simply created through the interaction between the materials, 
the artist and the interpreter; it is found in the interplay itself. It is the 
process of painting as much as the resources and the product that 
counts as law. Indeed, law cannot be broken down into its 
constituent parts without losing the essential part of the dynamic 
interaction itself. Because the materials change, the artists change 
and the interpreters change, the whole of law 
isgreaterthanthesumofitsindividualparts.Assuch,lawislessath
ingandmore an activity. And, as Raz himself would concede, if that is 
the case, then law is a human activity and inextricably bound up with 
the values and commitments of society. 
Raz is alert to the criticism that, without an interpretation-
independent identification of the law’s content, it will be 
incoherent to talk about fidelity or innovation. I would also add 
that, without such an identification, the mainstay of his positivist 
jurisprudence—namely, that law can be determined exclusively as a 
social fact and not as a moral evaluation—will be in great jeopardy. 
However, his response that such a critical ‘merging’ claim is false is 
typically opaque and enigmatic. It deserves to be stated in full: 
 
It overlooks the fact that the reason fidelity and innovation are often 
mixed is that we often have reasons to interpret in ways that mix them. 
But this is not always the case. Sometimes we have reason to interpret 
the constitution in ways that simply elucidate its content at the 
moment, warts and all. Such an interpretation, I call ‘conserving 
 
interpretation’, will be successful if it is true to the existing meaning of 
the constitution. It will include no mixing of conflicting elements. It 
will display no dialectical tension, and it will establish the benchmark by 
which we can measure other interpretations to see whether they are more 
or less innovatory.67 
 
This response is baffling as well as unconvincing. First, it is riddled 
with questionbegging elements, the most telling of which is that it 
assumes that we can distinguish a mixing from a non-mixing. In 
other words, Raz posits that there is an ‘existing meaning of the 
constitution’ against which a conserving, innovatory or mixing 
interpretation can be measured. Yet it is the very availability of this 
‘benchmark’ that is at issue. There is nothing here in Raz’s response 
that successfully deflects the critical claim that the law as-it-is can 
be identified and fixed as an object without some interpretation. It 
assumes that which is in contention. 
Secondly, Raz’s elliptical aside that a demonstration that the law 
is ‘vague and indeterminate’68 still counts as a statement of what 
the law is only adds fuel to the fire. If by this he means that some 
rules will be ‘vague and indeterminate’, there is no cause for critical 
concern; it would be wrong-headed to dispense with any theory of law 
simply because it is unable to identify and fix all legal rules with 
complete precision and absolute determinacy at any point in time. 
However, it is another thing entirely if Raz is claiming that widespread 
or structural indeterminacy is compatible with his positivist account 
of law. At a minimum, it would seem that there must be some 
significantly substantial degree of operational determinacy to law if 
 
he is to make good on his crucial and fast distinction between law 
and its interpretation. I maintain that such a threshold cannot be 
reached and that Raz’s claims founder on the dangerous rocks of 
(in)determinacy.69 
Law is much more than a collection of rules that individually 
and inevitably possess a degree of fuzziness and penumbral 
uncertainty. Taken as a whole, legal doctrine is structurally 
indeterminate and defies efforts to fix its necessary and precise 
meaning in particular cases at particular times. Adjudication is 
better understood as an interpretive activity in which the 
possibilities of determinacy and indeterminacy are constantly in play 
and available. It is not that fields of law appear as indeterminate or 
determinate all the time, but that even the most apparently 
settled areas of law are always vulnerable to being stabilised or 
destabilised and thereby reconfigured with sufficient effort by 
particular jurists at particular times and with varying degrees of 
success. The law is not simply there in its object-like presence, but 
it is always waiting to be apprehended and fixed by the active crafting 
of its interpreters and artisans. Most importantly, determinacy and 
indeterminacy are not pre-interpretive features of the law, but 
products of legal interpretation.70 Law’s meaning is always 
parenthetical and can never be grounded outside the contingent 
work of legal interpretation. As such, not only is it unhelpful, it is 
also impossible to talk of law’s meaning, whether determinate or 
indeterminate, as objective in the sense of being something 
that is realisable without legal interpretation. 
 
Accordingly, in the process of trying to salvage his claim that 
there is available an interpretation-independent identification of the 
law’s content as a matter of fact, Raz has only succeeded in 
undermining further his positivist insistence law’s factual existence. If 
a conclusion that the law is structurally indeterminate (as opposed 
to concessions about the penumbral openness of individual rules) is 
counted by Raz as a valid and acceptable statement of what the law 
is, then he has given unwitting support to the withering 
assessment that ‘pure positivism comes close to pure 
emptiness’.71 He has made the price of analytical accuracy the 
cost of practical worth. By setting the threshold of describing 
what ‘the law itself’72 is in an interpretation-independent way so 
low as to be virtually non-existent, what the law factually is can be 
whatever we morally want it to be. This is hardly a defence of legal 





Raz is an acquired taste. There is little doubt that Between Authority and 
Interpretation will be meat and drink to Razian enthusiasts. But his 
most recent publication will likely do nothing to convert those who 
are sceptical about the worth of the analytical project of legal 
philosophy generally or those who question the merits of a 
hard/exclusive rendering of legal positivism. Ironically, both kinds of 
reader will be reinforced in their stances by exactly the same 
 
qualities in Raz’s writings and arguments. The jacket of the book’s 
hardcover version encapsulates those contested features. It is a 
monochromatic photograph (taken by Raz himself) of what appears to 
be an austere landscape reminiscent of ‘badlands’ topography; it 
offers an aerial view of a bare landscape of dry and erosion-sculpted 
valleys. In the same way that this spare and stripped-down depiction 
of philosophy will appeal to the converted, its barren and bleak 
portrayal will also disenchant the more critical. As one of those who 
is not persuaded by Raz’s methodological approach or its positivist 
product, I would simply point out that law is a much more rich, 
complex and fecund territory than Raz’s philosophical and 
photographic imagery can capture; the ravages and revitalisations 
of time and chance are inescapable. A full appreciation and 
understanding of law warrants a much more colourful, sympathetic 
and organic mode of representation and analysis than Raz 
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